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“Aqui no hay barrios” (There are no barrios here) was what real estate 
agents told me when they showed me apartments in one of the middle-class 
zones of eastern Caracas, to assure me that the slum districts that house 
roughly half of the city’s population, called barrios in Venezuela, were safely 
distant. Shortly after I arrived in the country, a security official at the U.S. 
Embassy warned me never to travel into the slums. “The people there are 
so desperately poor,” he insisted earnestly, “that they’ll rob your shoes, 
your shirt, your eyeglasses, your belt — and that’s if you get out alive.” The 
barrios are often identified in everyday conversations like these as a kind of 
cancer on the city, pouring bodies into and draining resources out of the 
valley of Caracas. Caracas’s slums have been steadily growing since the 
1950s, but in the 1990s, their population surged alongside the marginal 
quarters of Bogotá, Lima, and the other outsized metropolises of Latin 
America. But in Venezuela this constituency has succeeded in leveraging its 
local energies into a national political movement. In a country where over 
85 percent of the population lives in cities, the radical social-democratic 
government of Hugo Chávez has counted largely on barrio residents for its 
base of support.1 The politics of media and journalism, moreover, have 
played a uniquely prominent role in the class conflict that has occupied 
Venezuelan society for the last six years. On both the right and left, the 
airwaves have become a critical theater in the political and social conflict 
of a divided nation. 
This study will concentrate on the politics of representation in con-
temporary Venezuelan television news and documentary, which in its 
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dominant mainstream forms have produced an urban imaginary that 
models national citizenship on the geographic, class, and racial divisions 
of the Venezuelan metropolis. The country’s political conflict demands 
careful attention from scholars, activists, and media workers confront-
ing the concentration of media ownership, cultural capital, and even 
urban populations themselves in a moment that presents both unprec-
edented technological possibilities for popular television and cinema and 
unmatched unfreedom in the official media sector. As Latin America, and 
the world, become majority-urban societies for the first time in history, the 
power of popular media to mobilize populations has arguably never been 
greater. In Venezuela, one barrio-based television station, Catia TVe, with 
the recent assistance of the Chávez government, has created an alternative 
television model that both reflects the radical possibilities and exposes 
some of the limitations of the Venezuelan political experiment. Catia TVe’s 
political objective is to raise popular consciousness, as radical avant-garde 
movements before them have done. However, it also aims to revise the 
old vanguardism. Instead of simply “developing the taste of the masses,” 
as the Cuban cinema of the 1960s sought to do, Catia TVe claims to put 
the masses behind the cameras, in a “participatory” model of television 
production that mirrors the chavista ideal of participatory democracy, 
an antibureaucratic democratic ideal that proposes to devolve power and 
statecraft to local populations. At the same time, this radical appeal con-
fronts a conservative media industry that has generally transcended the 
authoritarianism of its predecessors. Although Venezuela’s private TV 
has by no means abandoned the traditional appeals to patria, public order, 
and anticommunism, the alternative to chavista radicalism now wears a 
distinctly liberal, up-to-date costume — that of “civil society.” 
Catia TVe is an over-the-air UHF station based in Catia, the popular 
name for a large part of impoverished west Caracas, where almost all of its 
staff and volunteers live. The station’s programming consists of studio chat 
shows and digital video documentaries on neighborhood organizations, 
cultural life, and local history in Caracas’s working-class communities. Its 
name contains a pun on the Spanish verb ver, “to see”: pronounced Catia 
Te Ve, or “Catia Sees You,” the station’s name proclaims to its viewers 
that they are indistinguishable, at least in theory, from its producers. The 
station’s ubiquitous slogan, “No vea televisión, hagala” — Don’t watch 
television, make it — emphasizes that Catia TVe’s principal interest lies 
in transforming the means of television production, rather than altering 
the consumption of televised images. The station carefully tracks the 
neighbor hoods where its broadcast signal reaches, but Catia TVe staff do 
not attempt to quantify their viewing audience — training producers is their 
priority instead. The station’s life as a licensed broadcaster began in 2001, 
after the Venezuelan constituent assembly passed a landmark telecommu-
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nications law in June 2000 that granted broad legal recognition to com-
munity broadcasters. In order to qualify as a “community” broadcaster, 
70 percent of a station’s programming must be produced from within a 
particular geographically defined community, and the station must pro-
vide training and airtime to local citizens, who may not be clergy, party 
officials, or military officers. This law has made Venezuela’s airwaves some 
of the most open in the world for low-watt and neighborhood radio and 
television broadcasters. (Caracas also has dozens of low-watt radio stations, 
most of them located in the barrios, where population density makes even 
weak signals very effective.) Because of its speedy growth and its place in 
the national capital, the flashpoint of the national political conflict, Catia 
TVe has since become the unofficial leader in a national network of local, 
partisan television stations in Venezuela — from one of the first, TV Rubio, 
in a small Andean mountain village, to urban stations like TV Lara in the 
barrios of Barquisimeto. 
Catia TVe is distinguished by its organizational structure, which is 
built around what it calls Equipos Comunitarios de Producción Audio-
visual Independiente (Independent Community Audiovisual Production 
Teams), or ECPAIs. Catia TVe’s ECPAIs — there are approximately two 
dozen — are groups of anywhere from two to six people charged with 
scripting, filming, and editing the station’s programming, using handheld 
digital camcorders, Macintosh computers, and Final Cut editing software 
provided by the station. The station mandates that every volunteer com-
plete a rigorous orientation course on filmmaking techniques and film form 
before joining the station. The ECPAIs produce the vast majority of the 
programming with a minimal amount of editorial control from the station’s 
central staff, and they are the center of Catia TVe’s double communica-
tional and pedagogical mission. The station produces a wide variety of 
programming this way, from documentaries on local political movements 
to public service announcements to cultural reportage with no explicitly 
partisan content. For example, ECPAI Yaowe, which operated until 2006, 
was organized by a small team of students from the Armando Reverón 
School of Art, down the street from Catia TVe. Yaowe chronicled the 
folk histories and myths of Caracas’s barrios and the surrounding coastal 
communities. Its project, said Julio Loaiza, a member, was to assemble 
“oral history as a resource for the reconstruction of the collective memory 
of the community in Cota 905, Guzman Blanco barrio.”2 Two programs 
explored an unlikely story, given the dense urban setting: the residents’ 
secret histories of their neighborhood’s beleaguered natural landscape. In 
El Pino: Cota 905, neighbors recounted their stories of a long-dead pine 
tree, known as “el Pino,” that was known to harbor malevolent spirits. 
Even after it was cut down, the local story goes, the same supernatural 
forces stubbornly continued to haunt the street where it once grew. Another 
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similar program investigated a curious landmark in the 23 de enero bar-
rio: the “arbol de los peluches” (stuffed-animal tree), a shade tree hung 
with dozens of plush children’s toys over the years for reasons that no one 
quite recalls.3 In Timbores de Guayabal, Yaowe left Caracas for the fertile 
Barlovento coast, which lies some fifty miles east of Caracas along rocky 
mountain roads. There, shortly after the village’s anniversary celebrations 
of slave emancipation in Venezuela, Loaiza recorded a public rehearsal of 
the African drumming troupe of Guayabal, a small riverside village that 
was founded by fugitive slaves from the coastal chocolate plantations. 
(Guayabal, too, has its own fledgling local station, Tele Cimarrón, named 
after the Spanish word for an escaped slave or “maroon.”) Meanwhile, 
ECPAI Mente colectiva (Collective Mind) reported on Catia’s elaborate 
Carnival floats, and ECPAI Bienvenidos a nuestro barrio (Welcome to Our 
Barrio) interviewed residents of a neighborhood named Casalta about a 
government affordable housing program. Visual style and levels of techni-
cal expertise vary from show to show: Bienvenidos a nuestro barrio, for 
example, favors the scene “wipes” familiar to home videographers every-
Figure 1. The “Arbol de los peluches” (stuffed-animal tree) in the 23 de enero (23rd of January) 
barrio. Behind the tree are brick ranchos built by their inhabitants both on available land and on top 
of already existing houses. In the upper left is one of the public housing projects from the 1950s in 
the area, a relic of a different era in working-class housing. ECPAI Yaowe, El arbol de los peluches, 
Catia TVe, 2006. Courtesy of Catia TVe.
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where, and its affable host at one point accepted the hospitality of a Casalta 
family he was interviewing by holding a coffee cup up to the handheld 
camera and tipping it back, as if drinking through the lens. Yaowe, on the 
other hand, photographed and composed its subjects with careful attention 
to avant-garde visual style. 
Catia TVe has grown impressively during the Chávez years, when 
it moved from a volunteer effort run out of a room in Caracas’s National 
Library to a funded organization with a staff of thirty. In 2003, the station 
moved into a renovated nineteenth-century railroad warehouse in Catia 
donated by the city government. As in many small, community-based 
organizations, its growth has not been painless. Some ECPAI members 
complain privately that Catia TVe has become too complacent in its com-
munity networking, distant from its base neighborhoods, unaggressive in 
recruiting new members and new viewers, and newly bureaucratic. New 
programming is irregular and increasingly infrequent, and the station 
frequently rebroadcasts material produced by the national public channels. 
Most volunteers, working people who are unpaid for their labor at the sta-
tion, struggle with the burden of producing new programming. The station 
traces its roots to a “cine-club” founded in 1992 by several residents of 
Manicomio, a barrio in northwest Caracas near an old psychiatric hospital 
Figure 2. A young boy studies the drummers of Guayabal during an impromptu performance in 
the village school. ECPAI Yaowe, Timbores de Guayabal (Drums of Guayabal), Catia TVe 2006. 
Courtesy of Catia TVe.
3 0 Leary  •  The Politics of Television in Venezuela
from which it takes its name (manicomio means “insane asylum” in Span-
ish). Cine-clubs began to appear in the 1960s across Venezuela to screen 
and share Latin American films as well as locally produced material — “una 
imagen propria” (an image of our own) marginalized by an ascendant global 
mass culture. According to veterans of the cine-club movement, the Com-
munist Party of Venezuela played a prominent role in these popular edu-
cation and film programs, which inspired Catia TVe’s founders.4 Despite 
these difficulties, Catia TVe’s emphasis on the production process and a 
culture of what it calls “participation” has roots in both these politicized 
neighborhood film clubs and the cine urgente movement of the 1960s, the 
Venezuelan manifestation of the Latin American “Third Cinema” — the 
left-wing, mainly documentary film movements that famously thrived in 
Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina. The cine urgente proposed documentary as 
a superior film form for demystifying the cinema and bringing the viewer 
closer to the production process. Thirty years on, Catia TVe intends to 
bridge this gap between the spectator and producer by remaking the pro-
duction process itself.
1989: Year Zero 
To historicize Venezuela’s contemporary political transformation, most his-
torians point to the caracazo, the popular riots in 1989 against government- 
imposed “structural adjustment” measures and the largest such mass 
uprising in Latin America’s recent history.5 The riots began shortly after 
Venezuela’s newly elected populist social democratic president, Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, abruptly reversed campaign pledges to resist IMF-mandated 
economic reforms and implemented a set of austerity measures barely a 
month into his term (the sudden policy change was boldly named el gran 
viraje: “the big turnaround”). The most immediate cause for the revolt 
in Caracas, however, was sudden, steep raises in gas prices resulting from 
the removal of price controls on gasoline, and the private bus companies’ 
speculative exploitation of fare increases, which fell hardest on the barrio 
communities and working-class suburbs of Caracas. The demonstrations 
and looting continued for days.6 The caracazo was put down by violent 
military repression in the barrios that left anywhere from 277 (the official 
number) to at least 1,000 dead. The 27th of February is now commemo-
rated by the national government and local municipalities as a formative 
national tragedy — “the day that changed Venezuela,” as the tagline of a 
recent sentimental Venezuelan film about the revolt called it,7 or as one 
west Caracas activist described it to me, “year zero of the Bolivarian 
Revolution,” using the popular name for the radical political movement 
in the country. The uprisings were an explosion of discontent from the 
slums with Venezuela’s national political machine and the plain failures 
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of its democratic pretensions, yet none of Venezuela’s left-wing political 
parties anticipated, much less organized, the 1989 events — including the 
nationalist officers’ movement that Chávez then led as a dissident army 
officer. The 1989 uprisings signal, at the movement’s beginnings, the 
distinctions between Chávez and chavismo that many critics overlook: the 
movement that bears the president’s name emerged from a spontaneous 
mass uprising that the future president himself never anticipated, and it 
has retained a measure of that autonomy ever since. Although the Boli-
varian Revolution is famously ambiguous ideologically — revolutionary 
and third-worldist in much of its rhetoric and at its grass roots, but social-
democratic in much of the state’s actual economic policy — the political 
movement’s consistent antiparty and pro-barrio platform dates to the 
saqueo popular (popular looting) of 1989. 
Catia TVe places its own origins in 1989 as well. In the story cus-
tomarily told to visitors, local residents took a looted and abandoned 
government grocery store and transformed it into the Manicomio Casa 
de Cultura (Culture House), where the station began. Its founders point 
to the uprisings as a formative moment that underscored the need for an 
autonomous broadcaster, since the caracazo was an event heavily mediated 
by television. Images of looting occupied Venezuela’s television screens 
throughout the riots, and the government’s attempts to manage the situ-
ation through televised propaganda revealed how ill equipped it was in 
the face of popular rage. When the minister of the interior went on live 
television on the afternoon of 27 February to announce a curfew, he was so 
overcome by nerves that he could not deliver his speech. Disney cartoons 
abruptly interrupted the broadcast of the suddenly helpless minister.8 
Later that day, President Pérez addressed the nation and announced the 
imposition of martial law. As the violence spread, the president pleaded 
with his constituents: “No one must forget that I only have twenty days 
in government, this government that was born from the people and which 
will be for the people. The people must have confidence that everything 
will come out in a satisfactory way.”9 That same afternoon, Guillermo 
Barrios, president of Pérez’s social democratic party Acción Democrática, 
referred to the ongoing uprisings as a dangerous television event. The for-
eign media, Barrios complained, showed “the horror, the primitiveness” of 
the looting in the capital. They showed “the entire world the other face of 
Venezuela, the face of slums, of the hungry masses, of marginal people.”10 
Yet while foreign media broadcast scenes of military violence against barrio 
residents, domestic television concentrated on images of looting and sup-
pressed the story of state repression that Acción Democrática later sought 
to cover up. This domestic act of epistemic violence, then, compounded 
the military brutality of those days, as the activists that founded Catia 
TVe emphasized later. 
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Barrios’s notion of television as an instrument of cultural instruction 
and political order in an aspirant third-world nation like Venezuela raises 
an important contradiction. Venezuela’s populist social-democratic party 
could maintain this double discourse — between the oligarchic elitism of 
Barrios’s disavowal of “the primitive” poor, and Pérez’s populist gesture to 
the wisdom of the pueblo, or “the people,” the plebeian heroes of national-
ist myth — because both positions contained a fundamental mistrust, and 
no little fear, of what appeared to be a new, dangerous, and disobedient 
population: the barrio. The inhabitants of this apparently “new” urban 
geography — although by 1989 it was no longer terribly new — were seem-
ingly cast out of the Venezuelan modernity of which Caracas itself was 
once a showcase. They could therefore not be relied upon to simply “have 
confidence that everything will turn out well,” as Pérez had instructed 
them to. Such a people were not given to political rationality, either; they 
could only “erupt like a volcano,” as Chávez opponent Teodoro Petkoff, the 
ex-guerrilla, reformed Communist, and leader of the moderate left-wing 
Movement Towards Socialism party (and now a prominent newspaper edi-
tor), said in a congressional address after the caracazo. The Venezuela that 
“suddenly” erupted, Petkoff continued, “was not the Venezuela of workers 
organized in trade unions or associations. No, it was another Venezuela, it 
was the nonorganized Venezuela, the Venezuela that has been piling up in 
a huge bag of wretched poverty.”11 Could such a “wretched” people really 
be a part of el pueblo at all?
Catia TVe’s cofounder and longtime director, Blanca Eekhout, 
described the significance of the caracazo in terms of the media accounts 
that first stigmatized the poor as savage and then erased the repressive 
violence the state employed against them: “I think that there was a break 
in the confidence that the people could have in the media, in the possibil-
ity of believing in the world that they were selling. Now people knew that 
there was no access to that world, and that was the break. So from there, 
the need to have your own media, your own image grew up.”12 During the 
moment of crisis that the caracazo presented, Eekhout argues, television 
journalism abandoned the civic function most journalists claim in times 
of social peace — when journalism, as what Thomas Carlyle called the 
“fourth estate,” autonomously mediates the various interests of the state 
and citizenry in a democratic system. Instead, says Eekhout, it took a 
polemic stance as an informational apparatus of a repressive state. Today, 
Venezuela’s class polarization remains visible on the nation’s television 
screens. On one side, there is a cosmopolitan, middle-class Venezuela; on 
the other, state channels and new community networks project a third-
worldist, mostly urban nation. Until 2008, the country had two state 
channels and six privately owned stations available on national television; 
the oldest of these, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), has moved to cable 
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following the Chávez government’s revocation of its broadcast license. 
Venevisión, which exports programming all over the Hispanic world, is 
controlled by the politically influential family of Gustavo Cisneros, scion of 
a Cuban exile family that in the early 1960s parlayed a soft-drink fortune 
into his new country’s nascent television industry. Like Venevisión, Televen 
shows a mixture of news, game shows, and soap operas. Globovisión, a 
twenty-four-hour news channel modeled on CNN en Español, went on 
the air in 1995. Also available are an all-sports channel and a Catholic 
Church – funded nature channel.
The polarization of Venezuelan television is perhaps nowhere more 
pronounced than in the Sunday battles between Hugo Chávez’s weekly 
call-in show, Aló Presidente (Hello, President), broadcast on state television, 
and Globovisión’s six-day-a-week response, Aló Ciudadano (Hello, Citizen), 
hosted by the charismatic Leopoldo Castillo, Venezuela’s ambassador 
to the military government of El Salvador in the 1980s. Both programs 
are hours-long and offer a simulated participatory format. On Chávez’s 
largely improvised, often hours-long show — which treats a different topical 
theme from a different location each week — the comandante is in absolute 
control, despite the format’s performance of audience participation. On 
the other hand, Castillo’s daily, two-hour-long program claims to offer a 
more genuine audience participation through viewer polls, a text-message 
crawl across the bottom of the screen, and supposedly unscreened phone 
calls. Aló Ciudadano’s audience, callers, and studio guests are overwhelm-
ingly anti-Chávez.13 Both programs ultimately have more in common than 
they might acknowledge — they are utterly dominated by their stars, and 
they are polemic, although some Globovisión officials, when pressed, still 
maddeningly refuse to acknowledge their station’s obvious partisanship. 
(“The government just doesn’t like bad news,” one producer blithely told 
me when I asked about left-wing criticism of Globovisión’s reporting.) 
Television, print, and radio media have been one locus of chavista 
cultural policy, in large part because of a deep, sometimes visceral dis-
trust by government partisans of the commercial broadcast media for its 
antigovernment stance and, especially between 2000 and 2004, during the 
height of the conflict between the government and its opposition, the tele-
vision media’s often virulently abusive rhetoric. Luis Duno Gottberg has 
described how the Venezuelan television and print media constructed an 
image of “the masses” during this period as a racialized, irrational, and vio-
lent turba, or mob.14 In 2002, Carlos Ortega, then head of the opposition-
aligned trade union federation, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers 
(CTV), appeared on Globovisión to discuss the “Bolivarian Circles,” the 
pro-Chávez neighborhood organization named for Venezuela’s national 
liberator, who were constantly rumored to be planning violent attacks on 
east Caracas. “The terrorist circles, the violent circles that Chávez has 
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armed, are going to take over the malls,” said Ortega. “They are going to 
loot. They are going to kill, assassinate, massacre Venezuelans. That’s what 
is planned for this country, that’s the project.”15 In referring to imminent 
looting and violence by the chavista Bolivarian Circles — who served at this 
time as the shorthand for the sum of all racial and class fears — Ortega 
gestures to a memory of the caracazo as an explosion of barrio aggression. 
On 27 February 2002, the thirteenth anniversary of the caracazo, the 
well-known Televen journalist Marta Colomina described the circles — 
“misnamed the Bolivarian Circles,” she added in the consistently vocifer-
ous, exclamatory tone that characterized her exhausting show, La Entre-
vista, “rather than the chavista circles” — as popular gangs plotting attacks 
on anti-Chávez citizens. No details were provided.
After the April 2002 coup d’état that briefly overthrew Chávez, 
many feared a return to the military rule and U.S. intervention that Latin 
America had recently escaped.16 Many journalists on the left distinguished 
the Venezuelan overthrow as a peculiarly modern “media coup” because of 
the participation and endorsement of major broadcasters. These stations, 
then, did not need to be taken over by the generals, as in other coups d’état, 
but were enthusiastic allies from the beginning. The networks conducted 
an information blackout of the popular rallies and the military dissenters 
that demanded the return of the elected president, and some stations’ own-
ers reportedly met with the short-lived president, Pedro Carmona, after 
Chávez’s overthrow. After Venezolana de Televisión, the state channel, was 
forced off the air, several networks aired cartoons and nature programs 
while hundreds of thousands of mostly poor caraqueños, as residents of 
Caracas are called, besieged the occupied presidential palace in protest, 
an uncanny repetition of the caracazo episode when the minister of the 
interior’s failed speech was abruptly replaced by Disney films. Maurice 
Lemoine, writing in Le Monde diplomatique, attributed the coup’s success 
largely to the uniform support of what he called, a bit hyperbolically, “hate 
media.”17 Yet this analysis, like many media critiques on the left, overstates 
the instrumental power of television’s ideological messages and social role 
and attributes to the medium powers that it does not by itself possess in the 
absence of popular protest and an organized military conspiracy. These 
had developed over the previous three years of massive opposition mobili-
zation. Other critics have pointed to television’s important auxiliary role in 
organizing the anti-Chávez popular movements and its power to organize 
social collectivities and define the terms of social exclusion. Television’s 
political influence in Venezuela raises the vexed question of what, exactly, 
is the political use of television. Is it, as many suggest, the most important 
contemporary tool for defining social collectivities — the instrument of 
the “modernization of citizenship,” as one Venezuelan communications 
theorist puts it?18 Such claims about politics in the “TV age” show a hasty 
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technological determinism that overlooks, or even deliberately obscures, 
the lasting importance of movements, parties, civic participation, and 
social networks. Chávez, after all, was restored to power in April 2002 
mostly by mass pressure in the streets of Caracas, despite an unceasing 
mass-media campaign against him before and during the coup. That is, 
does not Chávez’s restoration to power in April 2002 rather show corporate 
TV’s ultimately limited power to define the terms of political debate?
State and “Alternative” Media
Besides grassroots television efforts like Catia TVe and community 
radio stations across the country, there are efforts at the state level to 
counter the hostile commercial airwaves. The Venezuelan government 
funded national television stations of its own, such as the traditional state 
channel, Venezolana de Televisión, two new public broadcasters, and a 
Caracas-based cable news network, Telesur, which is jointly funded by 
the Venezuelan, Uruguayan, Argentine, and Cuban governments. The 
government has also pursued legislative initiatives like the 2000 Telecom-
munications Act and the controversial 2003 Law of Social Responsibility 
in Radio and Television, which aimed to establish “the social responsibil-
ity of the providers of radio and television services, advertisers, national 
independent producers, and users, to foment the democratic equilibrium 
between their duties, rights, and interests with the end of promoting 
social justice and contributing to the formation of citizenship, democracy, 
peace, human rights, culture, education, health, and social and economic 
development of the Nation.”19 The law was initially heavily criticized by 
the television networks, which ran frequent commercials during daytime 
and evening hours calling it, with their own characteristic hyperbole, a 
“gag law.” Human Rights Watch denounced the legislation as a threat to 
press freedom, due to what it called the “subjective” nature of its strict 
regulations against sexual material, violence, and other “unacceptable” 
content. It went on to claim that the law’s imprecision on the definition 
of inappropriate content would encourage so-called “self-censorship” 
by broadcasters.20 However, the most dire predictions of the law’s oppo-
nents have not been fulfilled. There have been no credible allegations 
of censorship under the law, and its primary effects have so far been for 
cultural-nationalist and puritanical ends. The law banned on-air ciga-
rette and alcohol advertising, mandated hours for “family programming” 
and government-produced commercials, and compelled radio stations to 
devote 50 percent of their airtime to national artists.
Perhaps the most controversial media confrontation of Chávez’s 
tenure came in May 2007, when the Venezuelan government refused to 
renew the national broadcast license for RCTV, arguing that the station 
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had transgressed the terms of its license by inciting rebellion during the 
2002 coup. The station subsequently moved to cable TV, where it now 
broadcasts as RCTV International. Its space on the public airwaves has 
been replaced by TVes, a new state network with a name that mimics the 
pun of Catia TVe’s name — the station is pronounced te ves, or “you see 
yourself” — but is otherwise modeled on European state-funded “pub-
lic” networks like the BBC. The government’s move against RCTV was 
denounced in European and North American news outlets as an act of cen-
sorship. The decision was political in motive, of course — RCTV’s support 
for the 2002 coup was well documented, and it was known as a platform 
for anti-chavismo. RCTV was also embarrassed by a prominent whistle-
blower, Andrés Izarra, a senior producer who detailed the station’s policy of 
procoup censorship during the April 2002 overthrow (Izarra later became 
president of Telesur). In a recent article in The Nation, Daniel Wilkinson 
characterizes the RCTV shutdown as punitive and politically motivated, 
an episode that exemplified a central contradiction in the chavista project: 
that between the participatory democratic ideals of the Bolivarian Revolu-
tion and the authoritarian personalism of Chávez’s own leadership style. 
RCTV was not, as Wilkinson correctly notes, alone in continuing news 
programming hostile to the government; nor was it alone in its enthusiasm 
for the 2002 coup. With its license up for renewal, RCTV was, of course, 
a target of opportunity for the government. The closure of RCTV briefly 
galvanized Venezuela’s opposition, who were enraged by the provocation. 
Few chavistas deny the political motive behind the license revocation; 
control of the public airwaves, in this case, is an issue of revolutionary 
sovereignty. RCTV, others pointed out, had itself practiced the censorship 
of which the government now stood accused.21
Wilkinson does point out a crucial contradiction in chavismo that 
extends to Venezuela’s media battles — the radical movement’s reliance 
on its charismatic namesake. This contradiction is visible on Catia TVe, 
which on the one hand embodies the radical democratic ethos of chavismo 
in its aim to disseminate the means of media production to the urban 
poor. On the other hand, as new ECPAI-produced programming remains 
sparse and infrequent, more hours on the station’s airwaves are given 
to rebroadcasting presidential speeches and national campaign slogans. 
Despite these contradictions, the crucial distinction that Wilkinson clings 
to in his piece on Chávez’s media politics — that between authoritarianism 
and pluralism — would be rejected at Catia TVe. “Pluralism,” they say, is 
a liberal ideal that fails to take into account structural economic inequities 
that make true plurality impossible — what good is it, in other words, to 
talk of the pluralism of six corporate giants?22 The revocation of RCTV’s 
license was, perhaps, a strategic miscalculation by Chávez, as Wilkinson 
asserts — a provocation that went too far, reviving a previously dispirited 
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opposition instead of prodding it into overreaching as Chávez had suc-
cessfully done before. The move opened a door previously closed to all 
but the most partisan argument — that the Chávez government disrespects 
opposition criticism and represses free speech. After the RCTV contro-
versy, however, “free speech” could be defined not in terms of free access 
to the means of media production, still mostly controlled by corporations 
and the state in Venezuela, but rather in terms of the “freedom” of several 
voices to speak as loudly as they always have.
Catia TVe’s relationship to the state has also been the source of some 
controversy. At the station itself, funding — and not just state funding — has 
brought with it a new hierarchy among paid employees and volunteer 
ECPAI workers. In addition, the station’s ties to government have become 
more visible onscreen since 2002. Aside from its donated headquarters, 
grants from the telecommunications ministry and loans from PDVSA, the 
national oil company, together provide a minority portion of its operating 
costs. For some domestic critics, the station’s acceptance of such funding 
raises the question of its independence, especially since a frequent critique 
of private media in Venezuela is its fealty to conservative commercial and 
political interests. Such critics, like El Nacional journalist Oscar Lucién, 
have argued that Catia TVe’s pro-Chávez sympathies and its state fund-
ing compromise the station’s independence and its declared “community” 
function. Shortly after an opposition-aligned mayor ordered a police raid 
on Catia TVe’s transmitter in 2003, Lucién wrote, “Much has been said 
of the poverty, not only technical but on the level of programming, of the 
so-called community television and radio stations. [The] majority of them 
have compromised their spirit and basic proposals to transform themselves 
into uncritical cheerleaders for official policy, and their programming hides 
an ugly official [oficialista] manipulation.”23 (One RCTV reporter put it 
more crudely, in a well-publicized incident in which he charged a Catia 
TVe reporter and broke his video camera at an opposition rally they were 
covering: “Stop filming me, you spy, and tell your daddy Chávez to buy 
you a new camera.”24)
Lucién’s criticisms of “oficialista manipulation” also echo the cri-
tiques of Venezuelan “populism” that are frequently made in the Venezu-
elan and U.S. press. Confusing “populism,” clientelism, and caudillismo 
into a pathology of Latin American political underdevelopment, such 
accounts present an image of a charismatic leader bypassing institutional 
controls and dispensing largesse to key sectors that respond with loyalty 
or choreographed gratitude. Mass-media representations of populism 
frame the poor as passive objects of demagogic manipulation (the usual 
implication, of course, is that wealthier citizens are too sophisticated to be 
manipulated). Yet these critiques themselves seem so blinded by the light 
of the comandante’s charisma that they cannot imagine that the “masses” 
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might have the agency to condition or withdraw the support on which 
Chávez’s political life rests. Used in this way, “populism” becomes short-
hand for an underdeveloped political culture — an ordered, coherent system 
of manipulation, rather than a contingent discourse or a set of political 
practices, which subaltern groups can turn to their advantage and even help 
to craft.25 Yet the failure of a 2007 constitutional referendum promoted by 
Chávez shows that the chavista masses are not simply obedient.
One example from the Venezuelan press demonstrates the erasure of 
popular agency in mass-media representations of the “populist” political 
subject: a front-page photo in El Mundo, an afternoon paper, shows a dark-
skinned man crouching in the crook of a tree. He gazes off to the distance 
while meekly holding the Venezuelan flag; the caption identifies him as a 
“government sympathizer” demonstrating outside congress in support of 
the Movimiento Quinta República, Chávez’s old party (the current gov-
erning party is the newly formed Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, 
or the United Venezuelan Socialist Party). The text continues: “Just like 
in the times of ancient Greece, the decisions will be made in the street, 
except that in this session the representatives listened to the sovereign’s 
slogans, and not his proposals.”26 The ironic reference to ancient Greece 
underscores the caption’s caustic assessment of this plebeian “represen-
tative”: he is an instrument of his populist “sovereign” without political 
desires or will of his own, capable only of an emotional response to the 
Figure 3. An unidentified supporter of Hugo Chávez demonstrates outside the National Assembly in 
Caracas. From the front page of El Mundo, Caracas, 7 June 2003. Courtesy of El Mundo.
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leader’s charisma or to his own humiliation — that is, an irrational political 
subject mobilized by affect.27
Catia
Barrios: Residential settlements of progressive development, constructed 
through invasions of lands that do not belong to their residents, and which 
without a plan, or more specifically, without a project, meet the same 
requirements that any urban development built regularly in the same city 
at the same time must meet.
— “III Inventario nacional de barrios: caracteristicas socioeconómicas de 
las unidades de planifación física y las unidades de diseño urbano del area 
metropolitana de Caracas,” FONDACOMUN, 1993
The rhetoric of exclusion exemplified by the El Mundo image and caption — 
in which the leader is excoriated for his demagoguery and his supporters 
for their due obedience — relies further still on the mass-media image of 
the barrio that the crouching man implicitly also represents. However, the 
“participatory” television of Catia TVe is reflective of a broad trend toward 
a cultural and political revindication of the barrio that has accompanied 
the rise of chavismo and its allied social movements. Catia TVe, television, 
and politics in general in contemporary Venezuela cannot be explained 
without understanding these movements and this new constituency. When 
the last urban census was taken in 1993 by the official urban develop-
ment organization FONDACOMUN, metropolitan Caracas was home to 
2,685,901 people, of whom 1,085,543, or 40.4 percent, lived in barrios, 
figures that make Venezuela’s capital relatively small by the new stan-
dards of third-world urban demography — metropolitan Mexico City, for 
example, now shelters some 20 million inhabitants. As FONDACOMUN 
makes clear, all barrios have been founded as illegal invasiones (invasions) 
of public or private land “without a plan or a project”: in English they 
would somewhat more obliquely be called “squatter settlements” (the 
Spanish term retains more bluntly than our English phrase a sense of 
legal and even moral transgression). Although the Venezuelan historical 
literature on the subject is rather scarce, these “invasions” took off dur-
ing the 1940s and 1950s, largely due to the effects of petroleum-based 
capitalism, which crowded out domestic, particularly agricultural produc-
tion by driving up the value of the national currency and making imports 
cheap. Oil capitalism thus undermined Venezuela’s peasant agricultural 
sector at the same time as it created tremendous urban employment in 
the public works sector of the cash-rich state. During the dictatorship 
of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1948 – 58), the use of oil revenues for 
massive public works projects in Caracas and other Venezuelan cities 
drew laborers to the expanding barrios.28
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Central Caracas is built in a river valley within a range of mountains 
that spans the central Caribbean coast of Venezuela, and the old city 
center is surrounded by mountains to the north and smaller, steep hills 
to the west, south, and east. As the city has grown, middle-class urban-
izaciones (neighborhoods) have grown up on the valley’s eastern colinas 
(hills), whereas barrios (poor neighborhoods) have spread to the cerros 
(barrio hills) of the north, west, and far east — thus the economic divi-
sions of the area have been linguistically codified in the city geography. 
Between 1949 and 1971, the number of caraqueños living on the cerros 
grew from 117,337 to 682,000. As the city has grown, many formerly 
separate municipalities have been incorporated into the Distrito Federal. 
Catia, the geographical area from which the television station takes its 
name, cannot be found on any map. It is instead the popular name for 
the area between the nineteenth-century working-class districts of Caño 
Amarillo and La Pastora in the city center and the western limits of the 
city today. Catia is a well-known place, but because of the informal nature 
of the neighborhoods it contains, it is a highly ambiguous one: as one 
Caracas historian puts it, Catia “es todo y es nada” (it is everything and 
it is nothing).29 Until as recently as the 1940s, sugarcane and coffee grew 
on plantation land in much of the area now referred to as Catia. During 
the urban boom of the 1940s and 1950s, the force and numbers of rural 
migrants began to compromise these old titles by attrition. In 1946, 
the Flores family, who owned much of the area, tried unsuccessfully to 
evict some inhabitants of the newly settled Barrio Nuevo (New Barrio), 
today one of Catia’s older neighborhoods.30 The oil booms of the 1950s 
and 1970s spurred the growth of Catia and the expansion of Caracas in 
general, and much of Catia TVe’s work reflects an interest in the largely 
unwritten history of neighborhoods that have undergone tremendous 
transformation in only a few decades. 
Catia’s historical ambiguity is appropriate since many barrio neigh-
borhoods are often unmarked, or only approximated, on city maps and in 
most cases have been considered illegal “invasions” of private or public 
land. The irregularity of modern third-world slums, gradually built piece-
meal by their inhabitants, is one of their principal defining characteristics 
across countries and continents. Even as modern governments have aban-
doned the slums and their infrastructure to their inhabitants, they have 
also seen in them the threat of ungovernability, as did earlier governing 
regimes. For the urban reformers of nineteenth-century Britain and the 
United States, the metropolitan tenements were dangerous bellwethers of 
future disorder and despair. For those who chronicled this urban poverty, 
the slums were also epistemologically impenetrable, except for those few 
authors daring enough to venture into the city’s depths: “Deep are the 
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‘Mysteries of London’ and so environed by difficulties that few can pene-
trate them,” wrote George Godwin in 1854. Already excluded from the city 
proper, the impenetrable London slums were buried again in their literary 
representation — they could only be accessed and interpreted through the 
eyes of an expert outsider. This rhetorical tradition of elite commentary 
on the ghetto mysteries of the European industrial city found its way into 
American literature, as well, when Jacob Riis, the muckraking journalist, 
took the readers of his best-selling book inside the New York slums of the 
Lower East Side to see How the Other Half Lives (1890). 
The large slum districts of the modern contemporary third world 
recapitulate some of the same problems Riis saw in turn-of-the-century 
New York — overcrowding, crime, inferior public services, unregulated 
exploitation of labor, poor nutrition, and so on. Yet these newer districts, 
largely built by residents themselves on claimed land, and rapidly growing 
in spite of contracting urban labor markets, are part of a profound, even 
epochal demographic shift under way in the third world today.31 Catia 
TVe is, therefore, one of the first efforts to document and represent this 
transformation in formally new ways. Nevertheless, the representational 
terms familiar to readers of the Victorian city fictions still appear in both 
literary and state discourse around the barrio. In much of the material 
generated by Venezuelan state reform organizations, the legal transgression 
intrinsic to barrio expansion — so massive that after its initial phases it has 
generally discouraged even the pretense of enforcement — is rephrased in 
moral terms, in which the cordón de miseria is placed outside the norms of 
civilized society much as English observers looked on the “rookeries” and 
“fever nests” of nineteenth-century urban Britain as sites of moral and 
physical degradation. In at least one case, a government institution threat-
ened to turn this rhetorical practice of exclusion into a literal uprooting. 
In the introduction to its 1963 report to the Acción Democratica govern-
ment, the state’s Committee for the Rehabilitation of Barrios wrote, “Every 
day, we see in the newspapers stories about crime, rapes, assault, etc., and 
unfortunately these are committed by young men who come from or live in 
these [barrio] districts. They do not recognize the law and act as if it does 
not exist.”32 The committee was puzzled by residents’ insistence on staying 
in barrio neighborhoods once the construction jobs that first drew them 
disappeared; it could only desperately conclude that “they are stubborn and 
have not wanted to return to the country.”33 The report concluded by rec-
ommending the “eradication of the barrios within 10 years,” through the 
relocation of residents of neighborhoods deemed unsafe or beyond repair 
to temporary camps in the Caracas suburbs, followed by demolition and 
the construction of large-scale public housing (Manicomio, where Catia 
TVe began, was on the list of neighborhoods to be demolished).
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The pharaonic plan never got far off the drawing board, however. 
Besides its callousness — there is no suggestion that the residents to be 
evicted should ever be consulted in the plan — the report exemplifies 
deeper conflicts within Venezuela’s modern cultural and political history, 
particularly in its telling reference to peasant naïveté. Venezuelan literature, 
in particular, has generally charted social division and exclusion along the 
geographic axis of city and country, a distinction that, in the early 1960s, 
was transforming as the country moved to the city. Yet in government 
reports like this, the barrio looks like the closest contemporary cultural 
equivalent to the “barbarism” of Venezuela’s wild llanos (plains) in Romulo 
Gallegos’s canonical novel of Venezuelan nationalism, Doña Barbara. 
Written during the dictatorship of the military caudillo Juan Vicente 
Gómez (1908 – 1935), Doña Barbara charted the nation along the lines of 
the cultured city and the barbarous llanos, beyond the reach of the law. 
Gallegos’s hero — a Caracas intellectual with the significant name Santos 
Luzardo (Holy Light) — triumphantly resolves this intractable conflict in 
his campaign against the despotic female landowner of the novel’s title. 
The allegorical conflict between lettered city and lawless country repro-
duces the classic episteme of Latin American nationalist ideology, which 
was defined by the struggle between civilization and “barbarism” in the 
young republics. Today, however, the terms of this struggle have largely 
ceased to be defined by a national geography — the divide of city and 
countryside — and instead describe the urban imaginary of the contem-
porary nation of cities and slums.
This urban imaginary has been in large part produced on television, 
and it is in large part Catia TVe’s project to reverse the elite gaze of the 
slum chronicler, through the content of its programming and the structure 
of its documentaries’ authorship. One important theme in several of the 
station’s shows has been to contest the moral terms in which the original 
property transgression of barrio communities has been cast. In 2006, the 
ECPAI Vencedores (Victors) addressed this question by examining the 
meaning of the common word used for slum districts — invasiones — in a 
digital documentary called Invasores o Desplazados? (Invaders or Displaced 
People?). The film’s first half chronicled a land reform project under way 
in the barrios that seeks to regularize land tenancy by granting residents 
title to the houses they inhabit, to turn ambiguous “invasions” into legal 
ownership. Then, the filmmakers interviewed residents to find out what 
they thought of the term invasores, or invaders. All the subjects answered 
the question by referring not to tenancy or ownership rights, but to the 
years they had spent building their houses and the family roots they had 
established in their neighborhood. In other words, the belonging and citi-
zenship in the city that may be legally certified by ownership is, more fun-
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damentally, guaranteed by the labor of home- and community-building, 
which alone gives the law its content.34 For such residents, the barrio was 
above all a home, which they had built. In this way, Catia TVe aims to 
represent barrio communities engaged in active self-management, rather 
than depicting them negatively as social problems or sensational spectacles. 
Ricardo Márquez, a Manicomio native who until 2008 served as director 
of the station, says, “For fifty years we’ve been passive receptors of media. 
And the mass media have broadcast garbage. When they come to a poor 
neighborhood they denounce the murders, the criminals, the rapes. But 
they’ve never come to document the community organizing itself, the com-
munity fighting for its children, the community doing cultural activities. 
Nothing. They come to make news that bleeds.”35 
Civil Society versus the Mob
If one negative version of “populism” describes an underdeveloped politi-
cal culture dominated by a charismatic leader and his passive clients, 
anti-Chávez partisans, on the other hand, have sought to distinguish their 
political modernity and democratic agency. A popular term among this 
class constituency has been “civil society,” a normally ill-defined concept 
Figure 4. Freddy Rodriguez, a boxing coach in the Caracas barrio of Propatria, seen behind him 
here. From Freddy Rodriguez, Catia TVe, 2006. Courtesy of Catia TVe.
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that takes on an unmistakable class definition in its Venezuelan context. 
There, it is used to refer to the organized civilian opposition to Chávez. 
This is partly in keeping with a popular understanding of civil society as 
the “private sphere” of political society — that which is unaffiliated with 
and independent of the state. The term “civil society” is imprecise: it is 
used ambiguously to refer to constituencies ranging from liberal reform-
ers in former authoritarian Communist countries, to NGOs campaign-
ing against corruption in Latin American governments, to recipients of 
USAID grants in occupied Iraq. In his examination of the concept of 
civil society in Antonio Gramsci’s work, Joseph Buttgieg argues that 
the fall of the Communist regimes of eastern Europe in 1989 augured 
a revival of the term; “civil society” became popular in both East and 
West as a shorthand for the civic and labor organizations unaffiliated to 
the state that challenged Communist dictatorships in eastern Europe. As 
the term migrated into other political contexts, the liberal notion of civil 
society, Buttgieg charges, often became neoliberal because of its faith in 
the liberatory rule of markets and its implicit hostility to government as 
inherently authoritarian. In this “neoliberal” formulation, “freedom” is 
experienced in privacy; the state is pure coercion. “Civil society,” then, 
refers to a neutral zone where social conflict could be peaceably man-
aged, a “bipartisan” space of negotiation, to use a popular term from 
U.S. political culture. Buttgieg writes that for Gramsci, on the other 
hand, “the site of hegemony is civil society; in other words, civil society 
is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and reinforces its power by 
non-violent means.” For him, civil society was the “formidable complex 
of trenches and fortifications of the ruling class.” From this point of view, 
the liberal notion of civil society as an autonomous public space is itself 
hegemonic — a nonviolent neutralization of political struggle and a sphere 
whose independence is ultimately a fantasy.36 
Venezuelan television has often, in recent years, represented the barrio 
and chavismo in terms of explicit disgust and fear. More recently, however, 
this tone has been considerably tempered, even if the private media remain 
politically hostile to the government. Venevisión, for example, which used to 
air some of the most virulently anti-Chávez programming — some of which 
was avowedly racist — has ceased all of its political programming. On other 
mainstream stations, meanwhile, government spokespeople are now invited 
on commercial news programs, and some of the lurid sensationalism of 
their barrio news coverage has been modulated. On Globovisión’s Sunday 
program, Habla la calle (The Street Speaks), a sociologist commentator — 
he could be one of Romulo Gallegos’s characters, had the novelist been 
able to imagine modern television — walks through unnamed barrios, com-
ments on social conditions, denounces infrastructural problems, solicits 
complaints, dispenses advice, and offers sympathy to the residents there. 
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To account for this shift, Duno argues that television media operate 
according to a versatile “logic of exclusion,” which vacillates between a 
polemic exercise of erasure and an elite populist mobilization of empathy 
in constructing a national imaginary around the terms of “civil society” 
and “the mob.” Much mass media theory emphasizes the media’s role in 
constituting a social consensus around a set of hegemonic concerns. But 
Duno considers that in Venezuela, “the imaginary of consensus stops 
functioning for a period of time, and a curious exercise of exclusion is put 
into practice, operating through stigmatizing representations of a sector of 
national life designated as ‘the mob.’ ”37 In Venezuela’s private tele vision, 
“civil society” is a flexible concept that is called upon to delineate that 
which it is not — the mob. The use and abuse of the concept is useful for 
analyzing the antagonistic discourses of citizenship advanced by Catia 
TVe and Globovisión, the cable news network.
On 11 April 2002, as the Venezuelan coup was under way, the coun-
try’s middle- and upper-class political opposition filled the streets and 
television screens of Caracas. Amid live nighttime footage of overwhelm-
ingly white, middle-class protesters celebrating at the east Caracas airstrip 
where a plane commandeered by revolting officers had just carried Hugo 
Chávez to military detention, a female Globovisión anchor opined that “the 
government underestimated civil society,” leading to the final provocation 
that caused what then appeared to be the overthrow of the president. The 
anchor praised the heroic agency of the protesters while simultaneously urg-
ing them to leave the streets, the imagined site of the political confrontation, 
and return home: “Go home, you have done enough, civil society. You have 
done enough, you in the street. Or, if you are too emotional over what is hap-
pening, stay in your house.”38 Civil society is here the autonomous public “in 
the street” that can be summoned when needed to correct a wayward state 
and then dismissed, lest it get “too emotional.” This address to civil society 
was complemented on another channel by a threat to its unseen enemy. 
The same evening, a uniformed National Guard officer was interviewed 
on RCTV’s evening news program, El Observador. Pointing an index finger 
into the camera, the general addressed “chavistas fomenting violence in 23 
de enero,” a well-known historic section of Catia: “Don’t turn this situa-
tion into a blood bath because the National Guard has the most strength 
right now, and we are maintaining peace and tranquility. The same to the 
Bolivarian Circles (inaudible): We know where you are.”39 “Civil society” is 
maddeningly vague yet in a way extremely precise: civil society is everything 
but the “mob,” and one knows it when one sees it. Here, General Bustillos 
makes no effort to hide the fact that what Globovisión characterized as 
civil society’s decisive intervention at the airstrip was only made possible 
by uncivil military intervention — and he suggests that civil society’s safety 
will depend on the same state violence it theoretically abhors.
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This discussion of civil society in Venezuela is important to this study 
of the politics of television because via mass representations of “civil soci-
ety” and its antagonists, liberal notions of citizenship can be called upon 
to erase the people of the barrio as legitimate social actors and, in moments 
of crisis, mobilize violence against them. Whether as passive recipients of 
elite expertise and empathy, as in Habla la calle, or as an invisible threat, as 
in the general’s threatening gesture on El Observador, the barrio is written 
out of “civil society,” which then appears as a more class-bound concept 
than it may initially appear. An anecdote from Globovisión’s executive 
offices underscores this point: a station official admitted to me in an inter-
view that the station’s intended audience is the middle and upper class. 
“The lower classes don’t have the culture for news, only soap operas,” she 
added, with an unguarded directness that took me by surprise at the time. 
She then proceeded to define civil society as, on the one hand, “society 
as such,” the “society that has always existed” throughout the history of 
nations; but when pressed to give an example of civil society, she named 
the civic organization Súmate, the powerful, staunchly anti-Chávez NGO 
that monitors the Venezuelan electoral system. Her definition was revealing 
in that it nearly emptied the term of all meaning until “civil society” was 
synonymous with “society” itself, yet the term was specific enough in its 
colloquial meaning to be identified with the most well-known opposition 
organization in Venezuela, one headed, no less, by two white media stars 
from elite families. If there is no “outside” to civil society, to what society 
does the barrio belong?
Conclusions
Televised media in Venezuela present rival accounts of political citizen-
ship that reflect the divided city. Globovisión claims middle- and upper-
class Caracas as its audience, while for Catia TVe, west caraqueños are its 
audience, its producers, and its constituency. Globovisión, furthermore, 
advances a concept, “civil society,” that defines its audience and the sta-
tion itself. This concept of civil society has in many ways refined “el 
pueblo,” “the people,” the older and still-resonant historical constituency 
of Latin American nationalism. As we have seen, however, in mainstream 
television and elite political discourse before the rise of chavismo, both 
these political concepts have pointedly excluded the barrio, an exclusion 
that has accompanied extralegal violence in two major episodes. Yet while 
liberal notions of civil society defend a journalistic standard of impartial-
ity, Catia TVe has modeled in its programming and its pedagogical func-
tion an activist practice of citizenship in which “the media” are both an 
instrument of forming consciousness and a theater of political action in 
itself. It is important to note, however, that this mission remains in large 
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part aspirational — that is, winning an audience, maintaining a com-
munity of ECPAI-producers, and preserving the organic link the station 
desires to the poor communities of Catia are difficult tasks made even 
harder by bureaucratization that accompanies growth. In addition, the 
participatory nature of Catia TVe, like the radical-democratic ideal of 
Bolivarianism, must also contend with the sizable, increasingly indispens-
able personality of Chávez himself.
Catia TVe understands community media as historical in nature; that 
is, “vindicating” the barrio as a place of community, militancy, and culture 
means representing it as a place with a history worth telling. For founders 
like Eekhout, moreover, this project of vindication reflects a long history 
of marginalization of the urban poor: exclusion punctuated by periodic 
explosions of violence, as in the caracazo. As Duno points out, the “logic 
of exclusion” in Venezuela’s private media vacillates between episodes of 
racist scorn and instances of populist empathy for, and ultimately symbolic 
inclusion of, the urban poor. This tension is contained within the term 
“civil society” as it is practiced in Venezuela: it is a class-specific constitu-
ency opposed to the state (and by extension the chavista socialist agenda), 
but it also claims to represent a broad liberal consensus that transcends 
political, racial, and class interests. Politics, at least at a rhetorical level, is 
akin to the management of the government bureaucracy, not a battle of 
competing interests. The demobilizing logic of civil society applies even to 
itself — even while it celebrated the victories of “civil society” on 11 April 
2002, Globovisión was urging its soldiers home to their television sets. 
Catia TVe, on the other hand, sees its mission as one of consciousness 
raising for barrio solidarity and the “revolution,” and it makes no claim 
to neutrality. 
The station does not compete with the private industry on the field of 
content — that is, it does not aspire to disseminate more “positive” images 
of barrio residents, in a multiculturalist vein. Instead, it works to transform 
the forms and structure of television production. The station’s pursuit of 
a nonprofessional, working-class population of producers and its commit-
ment, not only to disseminate different messages than the private media, 
but also to look and sound as unlike them as possible — that is, to manipu-
late the forms of mass communication — are important points for creators 
of oppositional media in other countries who seek not only to change media 
messages but alter the way people approach and understand the media. In 
the United States, on the other hand, Noam Chomsky and Edward Her-
man’s “propaganda model” of media control, which sought to empirically 
prove media bias based on fealty to elite economic and political interests, 
has had a lasting impact in Left criticism of the mainstream news media, 
at least in the English-speaking world. Herman and Chomsky identify five 
“filters” that determine the content of mainstream journalism: ownership 
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of media firms, advertising interests, bureaucratic management, the “flak 
machines” of rightist pressure groups, and lastly, anticommunism. The two 
authors do not use a Marxist critical vocabulary, but they consider the same 
question that Gramsci asks in his prison reflections on “hegemony” — 
what are the cultural processes by which the ruling class extends its 
dominance by consent, rather than coercion? Their methodology, on the 
other hand, recalls Louis Althusser’s concept of “ideology.” Ideology, 
Althusser wrote, structures the subject’s “imaginary relationship” to the 
social relations of production as a natural fact: the way “things are or must 
be.”40 This imaginary relationship takes shape in and through “ideologi-
cal state apparatuses” — the bureaucracies of the government, education, 
media, and the like. Chomsky and Herman’s mass-media “filters” are, 
like Althusser’s “ideological state apparatuses,” machines for making 
compliant subjects. In Manufacturing Consent, the authors argue that the 
modern mass media aim to “inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, 
and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional struc-
tures of the larger society.”41 This critique of the media, like Althusser’s 
analysis of the immanence of ideology, tends to leave the reader feeling 
prone and powerless in the face of such an awesome brainwashing machine. 
Moreover, Chomsky and Herman only consider the allegedly false content 
of the mass media, at the expense of any substantial critique of the forms 
that mainstream journalism takes. This oversight is crucial to the deep 
pessimism of Chomsky and Herman’s theory — for how can media critics 
and rank amateurs ever compete with transnational news corporations on 
the level of content?
In its emphasis on the radical importance of form, Catia TVe’s 
approach resembles many other Brechtian and Marxist theories of insur-
gent theater and cinema, from the Soviet Union to the Latin American 
“third cinemas.” In his 1969 manifesto, “Towards an Imperfect Cinema,” 
Cuban film director Julio García Espinosa argued that Cuban and Latin 
American cinema should not imitate the technical mastery of Hollywood 
and European film since such aesthetic “perfection” simply separated a 
professional caste of filmmakers from the mass of uninitiated viewers. “We 
cannot develop the taste of the masses,” he wrote, “as long as the division 
between the two cultures continues to exist, nor as long as the masses are 
not the real masters of the means of artistic production.”42 Digital tech-
nology has made filmmaking more accessible (and more democratic) in 
Venezuela today than García Espinosa could have imagined in Cuba’s film 
industry in 1969. Catia TVe’s devolution of authorship to nonprofessional 
producers without the financial or cultural capital of media profession-
als and many urban activists separates this movement for “community 
media” from the state’s funding of Venezuelan professional filmmakers in 
the 1970s and from many of the student and media activist organizations 
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in North America and Europe. For example, Indymedia, the most well-
known of these, is politically alternative without being in any real sense 
communitarian or popular since it is based in communities with the cultural 
and even financial capital (however limited this may be in relative terms) 
of radical intellectuals.43 
The forms taken by cultural texts help to shape, often without us 
fully knowing it, the meanings we ascribe to a particular work of art and 
the horizon of possibilities we envision in the social world of which that 
work, and ourselves, are a part. Catia TVe argues that mass television in 
Venezuela has produced a passive, exclusionary notion of citizenship. This 
exclusion is expressed both in occasional mobilizations of violent contempt 
and, more recently, in civil performances of “nonpartisan” inclusion. On 
the other hand, Catia TVe’s work has shown how impoverished this term 
“civil society” has become in its Venezuelan context, where its meaning 
comes largely from its ability to define what it is not: “the mob.” In the hills 
of far east Caracas, where Catia TVe filmed one of its most often-repeated 
programs, the zinc-roofed ranchos and the earth roads flood in the rainy 
season, and residents must pack into jeep taxis for the long trek to the city of 
glass and concrete below. Yet even there, a resident announced to the Catia 
TVe microphone with perfect conviction, “Here, everything is possible.”44 
How could a viewer believe him? Limited as they are by technological, 
economic, and even geographical barriers, popular media have power, as 
we have seen, to challenge both the visual forms and the content of the 
Figure 5. A resident of the United Republic of Petare addresses the camera during filming of 
Cayapa en la comunidad (Cayapa in the Community), a Catia TVe program recorded in 2004. 
Courtesy of the author.
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radio and television programs with which we are daily surrounded. In so 
doing, such media might also widen the horizon of possibilities for viewers 
and producers in a starkly divided city where real equality can seem as 
remote and inaccessible as Globovisión’s gated, multimillion-dollar studio. 
Anything, then, might seem possible. 
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program provided support for this project.
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